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A TERRIFIC SCHOLAR AND A WONDERFUL 
HUMAN BEING 
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY∗ 
 A few years ago I was handling a difficult case in the Supreme Court 
concerning the ability of reproductive health clinics to sue extremist anti-
abortion groups.1 Relatively late in the process, our legal team decided 
that an amicus brief on behalf of a leading women’s rights organization 
would be helpful. The organization asked Professor Steve Gey and, with-
out hesitation, he agreed to write the brief. He wrote a superb brief in a 
very short time. His ideas and thinking helped me greatly as I prepared 
for oral argument. Professor Gey did all of this, as he does everything, 
with enormous enthusiasm and unflagging good cheer. 
 Over the years, Professor Gey and I have appeared on a number of 
panels together at conferences across the country. The discussions always 
are better because of his participation, but even more, they are always so 
much more fun if he is part of them. 
 Professor Gey is an enormously productive scholar. He is the coauthor 
of two casebooks, several chapters in books, and literally dozens of arti-
cles. Prose in law review articles is famously stilted, but Professor Gey is 
the relatively rare law professor who writes with grace and style. He also 
writes with passion; it is obvious to the reader that he really cares about 
constitutional law. 
 Much of his writing has centered on the Establishment Clause of the 
First Amendment. His articles are among the best scholarship in the area 
in recent years. One of his most recent articles is particularly noteworthy. 
In Life After the Establishment Clause,2 Professor Gey predicts that the 
newly reconfigured Supreme Court is likely to take what he calls an “inte-
grationist” approach to the Establishment Clause. He reviews the effects 
of the Court’s historical separationist approach to this Clause. Professor 
Gey notes that the Court has inconsistently applied its strict separationist 
theory, but argues that the Court’s overtures to separationism have served 
to constrain the scope of court decisions permitting government action that 
endorses religion. He also argues that this approach has created a power-
ful popular expectation of separationism, which has further constrained 
court decisions in this area.  
 Professor Gey then reviews the major components of the new integra-
tionist paradigm: (1) religion has defined American political culture and 
the separation of church and state deviates from this norm; (2) the reli-
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gious majority should be allowed to exercise its political influence on the 
government; (3) religion is a relevant factor in political decisionmaking; 
(4) local religious majorities have a legitimate interest in incorporating the 
dominant religious perspective into their communities and church-state 
dispute resolution should be decentralized; and (5) the government is per-
mitted to incorporate moral absolutes into its legal mandates. Professor 
Gey argues that this approach would most harshly affect religious minori-
ties living in small, less diverse communities. He also notes that permit-
ting the government to incorporate moral absolutes into legislation would 
undermine protection of fundamental rights such as the use of contracep-
tives and abortions.  
 Professor Gey argues that these implications contradict the constitu-
tional assumption that the government should not decide matters of theol-
ogy or ultimate truths on behalf of citizens. He critiques integrationists for 
naïvely equating truth with power. He predicts that the new standards the 
Court will likely adopt would tend to permit the government to practice 
religious favoritism as long as the government engages in a few formal 
measures to comply with the Clause. Finally, Professor Gey suggests that 
the integrationist attempt to fundamentally revamp Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence would not likely succeed. He reasons that the principle of 
church-state separation is deeply ingrained in the nation’s culture, that re-
ligious demographics are rapidly changing, and that the new paradigm 
would radically assign the government essentially unlimited power. 
 This is a wonderful article; the best that I have seen in analyzing the 
likely changes on the Supreme Court with regard to the Establishment 
Clause. Professor Gey does a masterful job of showing the shift and why 
it is wrong and unlikely to succeed. Any discussion of the Roberts Court 
and religion will need to begin with Professor Gey’s article. 
 One of my favorite of Professor Gey’s articles was written over a dec-
ade ago: The Case Against Postmodern Censorship Theory.3 This article is 
a superb response to theorists who called for restrictions of hate speech 
and pornography in the name of advancing equality. In it, Professor Gey 
takes on critical race theory, civic republicanism, and MacKinnon femi-
nism. He argues that these theories are neither progressive nor postmod-
ern, but instead simply amount to radical censorship. He critiques social 
constructionism as a core justification underlying all of the main groups’ 
arguments for postmodern censorship. Professor Gey notes that empower-
ing the government to regulate speech under this justification would pro-
vide the government enough discretion that it could use its powers in ways 
that reinforce the very “reigning paradigms” that critical race theorists and 
feminists seek to overthrow. Professor Gey also critiques the postmodern-
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ist erasure of a public/private distinction as antidemocratic, politically na-
ïve, and improperly justified based on rhetorical excess. 
 Professor Gey argues, in part, that the flaws in the social construction-
ist argument advocating censorship are the same as the flaws in the “new 
paradigm”: (1) empirical—the theories rely on many unprovable empirical 
assumptions; (2) epistemological—the theories assume that “constructed” 
society has distorted the ability of individuals to judge and respond wisely 
to reality, which undermines the argument that the postmodernists them-
selves have it right; (3) political—it is unlikely these theorists could ever 
achieve their ultimate goal of a society effectively cleansed of the ideas 
and expression targeted by their proposals since the empowerment of gov-
ernment to regulate speech does not necessarily mean that the government 
will suppress the speech these theorists consider “bad”; and (4) theoreti-
cal—although these theories aim to create a more egalitarian political sys-
tem, they actually produce an inherently elitist political system. 
 Professor Gey finally attacks the postmodern elevation of equality as 
equal in weight to free speech protection. This elevation provides a dan-
gerous invitation for the government to either significantly dilute First 
Amendment protections by weighing First Amendment guarantees against 
all other constitutional interests or significantly dilute all Bill of Rights 
protections in the name of protecting equality. 
 A great deal has been written about the efforts to suppress speech in 
the name of equality, such as advocacy of hate speech laws by some criti-
cal race scholars and antipornography laws by some feminist scholars. 
Professor Gey ties this together and writes the best response I have seen. 
It is a brilliant article.4    
 Although most of his articles are about speech and religion under the 
First Amendment, Professor Gey has written about virtually every area of 
constitutional law, from the dormant commerce clause5 to the death pen-
alty.6 It is a tremendously important and incredibly impressive body 
of scholarship. 
 Academics think constantly about why we write articles. Each of us 
hope that our articles will advance knowledge and have some effect on 
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understanding. Professor Gey has succeeded enormously in his work. He 
is a model for us all. 
 
